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S E C R E T CONAKRY 000537

#### NOFORN

FOR DS/IP/AF AND DS/IP/ITA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2029
TAGS: <u>ASEC KDEM PGOV PREL PMIL GV</u>

SUBJECT: CONAKRY SECURITY SUMMARY - SEPTEMBER 4, 2009

REF: A. CONAKRY 493

1B. CONAKRY 494

1C. CONAKRY 503

1D. CONAKRY 506

1E. CONAKRY 513

1G. CONAKRY 518

1H. CONAKRY 519

1I. CONAKRY 528

Classified By: RSO Philip W. Nazelrod for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

11. (U) The security situation in Guinea is calm but tense. The last two weeks ushered in violent protests upcountry, anti-CNDD demonstrations in Conakry, and an unremarkable Presidential rally at the People,s Palace. The following serves as summary of significant security-related events during this timeframe.

#### The Marker

12. (C) On August 20, 2009, the US Government issued a press release highlighting, among other things, that the transparency and credibility of any elections would be weakened if a member of the CNDD announced candidacy. This elicited an immediate response from the GOG condemning the press release and accusing the USG of interfering in domestic affairs. Sparking intense debate, the GOG issued a series of communiques which, in turn, were answered by a declaration by the political group Les Forces Vives. (Reftel A and Reftel D).

#### The Demonstrations

- 13. (SBU) On August 24, 2009, residents of Kamsar, Guinea gathered to protest the increasing lack of available electricity. Their protest turned violent, resulting in razed buildings and accusations of looting which forced the GOG to respond by dispatching military personnel. Minister of Presidential Security, Claude Pivi (aka Coplan), was sent to the region to lead the GOG,s efforts to quell the demonstrators. Two civilian fatalities were reported along with an unknown number of casualties. (Reftel B).
- 14. (SBU) On August 24, 2009, youth in Macenta, Guinea (forest region) reportedly demonstrated in protest of fiscal mismanagement by local government authorities. Sources claim

that the youth were promised money by the CNDD in return for orchestrating pro-CNDD demonstrations. The youth protested, believing the CNDD paid the promised monies to the local authorities, but that those same authorities kept the money for personal use. (Reftel F).

- 15. (U) On August 27, 2009, youth in Conakry, Guinea established makeshift roadblocks in the capital city. Earlier, sources claimed that Conakry,s youth would protest in opposition to the CNDD. The demonstrations failed to materialize in any substantial quantity. (Reftel E).
- 16. (U) On August 30, 2009, a group of approximately 200 youths demonstrated in front of the US Embassy. Demonstrating against the CNDD, the group called itself the Movement that Dadis Must Leave (MDDP). Later that afternoon, a group numbering between 40 and 60, gathered momentarily in front of the US Embassy to demonstrate in support of the CNDD. (Reftel H).
- 17. (C) On August 31, 2009, tensions rose as CNDD President Dadis Camara hosted a planned rally at the People,s Palace in downtown Conakry. It was a widely held belief that Dadis would use the rally to announce his candidacy for president. Impromptu, short-lived, and unremarkable demonstrations were reported throughout Conakry. (NOTE: President Dadis, in his speech at the Peoples Palace, referred to the killing of one Gendarme by demonstrators during the recent protests. One fatality was later confirmed, a result of careless motor vehicle operation. END NOTE). (Reftel G).

## The CNDD,s Response

- 18. (SBU) On August 25, 2009, local media reported that the CNDD ordered cellular phone companies to turn off their texting services. This reportedly was ordered in response to the proliferation of anti-Dadis text messages being sent through the community. Texting services were turned back on two days later. (Reftel C).
- 19. (U) Uniformed members of both the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Security saturated Conakry,s major traffic arteries during the August 27, 2009 demonstrations and again for the rally on August 30, 2009. Gendarmes (many recent academy graduates) alongside special police units (BAC and MAMBA) and a smattering of Red Berets established an overwhelming show of force at traffic circles which included displays of armored vehicles and the brandishing of automatic weapons.
- 110. (U) On September 2, 2009, the CNDD, s National Communications Council (CNC), which regulates Guinea, s media, officially banned political debates from being broadcast by radio and television stations. Local media reports claim the order was issued in response to pressure by the junta. (Reftel I).

# The Putsch

- 111. (S) On August 24, 2009, sources reported an unsuccessful counter coup was attempted in Camp Alpha Yaya. Reportedly, seven soldiers were mortally wounded and another 19 were arrested and interrogated. The putsch reportedly occurred while Minister of Presidential Security Claude Pivi was in Kamsar to quell the violent demonstrations which occurred earlier that same day. However, diplomatic contacts did not pick up and indicators of a counter-coup.
- 112. (S) Sources report that President Dadis, along with his close advisors, responded by bringing in additional (estimated between 1,000 and 3,000) soldiers from the Forest Region; thus, cementing Dadis, supreme position in Alpha Yaya.

## The Crime

- 113. (S) Sources report that military officers continue their night time raids of residences in an effort to intimidate youth and political opposition leaders. Checkpoints, legal and illegal, continue to be constructed at night and remains staffed by 'men in uniform' bent on securing payment for passage.
- 114. (U) Crime in Guinea continues the upward trajectory often seen during Ramadan. Thefts and other acts of banditry plague Guinea,s cities and countryside, often peaking during the final week of Ramadan.

Comment

115. (S) Tensions in Guinea are palpable. Military and police units continue to patrol the city in a striking show of force. Police and gendarme vehicles (including newly purchased or donated trucks) patrol the city frequently and units appear to 'camp' at all major traffic circles. Furthermore, sources relayed that some in the President,s entourage believe the US Embassy actively encouraged the recent anti-Dadis demonstration. The same sources report that pro-CNDD youth are planning future demonstrations at the US Embassy, including staging a 'sit-in' on NEC grounds.

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